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Britain and genocide: historical and
contemporary parameters of national
responsibility
MARTIN SHAW*
Abstract. This article (originally given as the Annual War Studies Lecture at King’s College,
London, on 25 January 2010) challenges the assumption that Britain’s relationship to
genocide is constituted by its ‘vigilance’ towards the genocide of others. Through a critical
overview of the question of genocide in the historical and contemporary politics of the
British state and society, the article suggests their wide-ranging, complex relationships to
genocide. Utilising a conception of genocide as multi-method social destruction and applying
the interpretative frames of the genocide literature, it argues that the British state and
elements of identifiably British populations have been involved directly and indirectly in
genocide in a number of diﬀerent international contexts. These are addressed through five
themes: the role of genocide in the origins of the British state; the problem of genocide in
the Empire and British settler colonialism; Britain’s relationships to twentieth-century
European genocide; its role in the genocidal violence of decolonisation; and finally, Britain’s
role in the genocidal crises of the post-Cold War world. The article examines the questions
of national responsibility that this survey raises: while rejecting simple ideas of national
responsibility as collective guilt, it nevertheless argues that varying kinds of responsibility for
genocide attach to British institutions, leaders and population groups at diﬀerent points in
the history surveyed.
Martin Shaw is a sociologist of global politics, war and genocide, and is currently
Professorial Fellow in International Relations and Human Rights at Roehampton Univer-
sity and honorary Research Professor at the University of Sussex, where he held the Chair
of International Relations and Politics from 1995 to 2008. His many books include War and
Genocide: Organized Killing in Modern Society (Cambridge: Polity, 2003); The New Western
Way of War: Risk-Transfer War and Its Crisis in Iraq (Cambridge: Polity, 2005), and What
is Genocide? (Cambridge: Polity, 2007). His personal website is {www.martinshaw.org} and
he is a regular contributor to {www.opendemocracy.net}.
There have now been ten Holocaust Memorial Days in Britain. In June 1999 the
then Prime Minister, Tony Blair, was asked in Parliament to institute such a day
and replied: ‘I am determined to ensure that the horrendous crimes against
humanity committed during the Holocaust are never forgotten. The ethnic
cleansing and killing that has taken place in Europe in recent weeks are a stark
* This article is a revised version of the Annual War Studies Lecture given at King’s College, London,
on 25 January 2010, on the eve of the annual Holocaust Memorial Day.
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example of the need for vigilance.’1 Blair was referring of course to the Kosovo
War, during which he had been among the NATO leaders most committed to
securing the return of the expelled Albanians. When Blair made his remarks,
Serbian President Slobodan Miloševic´ had recently capitulated and British troops
were about to enter Kosovo. And although Holocaust Memorial Day is an
international event – its origins lie in the Gedenktag für die Opfer des National-
sozialismus (Anniversary for the Victims of National Socialism) held in Germany
since 1996 – Blair’s comments indicated its particular British significance.2 In
Britain, Holocaust Memorial Day remembers genocide that other nations have
committed, whether the Nazi extermination of the Jews or the Serbian expulsion
of the Kosovo Albanians, and against which our country stands as a ‘vigilant’, and
if necessary armed, protector of the innocent. Not for the British the national
self-criticism that produced the German commemoration, or which even in
Australia and the US has produced oﬃcial recognition of crimes perpetrated
against indigenous people in the course of colonisation. Not for Britain even the
academic debate about our country’s relationship to the history of genocide, which
has preoccupied intellectuals and scholars in these countries.3 The institution of the
Memorial Day did, it is true, provoke some discussion among Holocaust scholars,
one of whom opposed its institution on grounds that included the danger that ‘the
day will act as a convenient opportunity for the government to present itself as
morally upright, thereby occluding its involvement in contemporary ethnic,
religious or other forms of discrimination’.4 Another warned of the danger of
reinforcing the British people’s ‘rather self-satisfied perception of the Second World
War as unambiguously a “good” war from which this country emerged triumphant
and morally vindicated’. Instead, David Cesarani argued, we should recognise that
‘[t]he ambiguity of Britain’s response to Nazi tyranny and racism is lodged in our
heritage’.5
My primary aims in this article are therefore to remedy these deficiencies in a
more systematic way, concerning genocide in general as well as the Holocaust in
particular: to question the assumption of British impunity; to argue for a debate
about Britain’s role in the history and current politics of genocide; and to make a
first attempt to define its parameters. However some disclaimers are necessary. In
calling for this debate, I do not suggest that Britain bears an equivalent historic
responsibility to that of Germany or any other country (although I shall argue that
1 Home Oﬃce, Government Proposal for a Holocaust Memorial Day (October 1999), available at:
{http://www.homeoﬃce.gov.uk/documents/cons-1999-holocaust.pdf} accessed on 11 December 2009.
2 Although Levene, ‘Britain’s Holocaust Memorial Day’, suggests that this day results from a Swedish
initiative, Andrew Pearce, ‘The Development of Holocaust Consciousness in Contemporary Britain
1979–2001’, Holocaust Studies, 14:2 (2008), emphasises Britain’s role in this instituting this event
internationally.
3 The German literature is too extensive to cite, but for Australia, see A. Dirk Moses (ed.), Genocide
and Settler Society: Frontier Violence and Stolen Indigenous Children in Australian History (Oxford:
Berghahn, 2004), and for the US, Samantha Power, A ‘Problem From Hell’: America and the Age
of Genocide (London: Flamingo, 2003).
4 Dan Stone, ‘Day of Remembering or Day of Forgetting? Or, Why Britain Does Not Need a
Holocaust Memorial Day’, Patterns of Prejudice, 34 (2000), pp. 53–9. Mark Levene, ‘Britain’s
Holocaust Memorial Day’, while approving the institution of the Day, went further in accusing the
government of ‘brazen hypocrisy’.
5 David Cesarani, Britain, the Holocaust and its Legacy: the theme for Holocaust Memorial Day (2002),
{http://www.hmd.org.uk/files/1149797162–22.pdf} accessed on 30 December 2009, p. 2, emphasis
added.
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British agencies and people have sometimes been perpetrators, as well as implicated
in the genocides of others, the British state has not practised large-scale, centrally
coordinated genocide). Nor do I suggest that Britain is alone in lacking the kinds
of national debate that Germany and Australia have had; on the contrary, absence
of debate is the international norm, even in countries like Japan and Russia where
huge questions should arise about relatively recent history. Nor do I call for this
debate so that we will call on our government to apologise to the victims of past
atrocities that British institutions have perpetrated, condoned or failed to prevent.
Indeed although I use the term ‘national responsibility’ in my title, this idea
needs radically unpacking from the outset. Entire nations are not responsible for
the actions of their distant ancestors or even, in any simple sense, of their recent
governments. The idea of collective national responsibility or guilt is one that
informs genocidal thinking – for example, Adolf Hitler’s belief that the Jews were
responsible for Germany’s defeat in the First World War lay behind his
programme for their destruction. Scholars have no business perpetuating this idea.
Therefore by national responsibility I mean the direct and indirect responsibility of
particular national leaders, institutions or groups in society, for particular policies,
actions and outcomes. I do so in order to propose and explore the implications of
a diﬀerentiated concept of responsibility. As to apologies, it would be reasonable
(in principle) to ask a Labour government, for example, to apologise to Serbs or
Albanians for bombings in the Kosovo War, since the lines of responsibility
connecting current leaders to recent actions are clear, and current Serb and Kosovo
Albanian populations contain people who suﬀered from NATO bombing in 1999.
But it makes less sense to ask that government to apologise for the policies of the
British Empire in India or Africa a hundred or more years ago, when the Labour
Party barely existed, to populations who are at most distant descendants of the
Empire’s victims.
My more general aim, therefore, is to promote a less simply political and more
historically reflective discussion of the prevalence of genocide, in both modern
history and contemporary politics. In this sense, my British focus is a way of
suggesting that, if Britain is implicated in genocide in multiple and complex ways,
then genocide must be a larger problem than is often assumed; I want to stimulate
reflection on this problem. I had a parallel motive for addressing this in the forum
of the Annual War Studies Lecture. Genocide has been perpetrated so frequently
in the context of war – from the Second World War to Kosovo and beyond – that
I want to provoke thought about both the circumstances in which war leads to
genocide and the diﬃcult questions of whether, or under which conditions, military
power may also play a part in preventing or halting genocide. However even if
genocide is more prevalent than commonly believed, and often occurs in the
context of war, it remains crucial to distinguish genocide clearly from war and from
non-genocidal oppression, if only to fully explore their complex linkages. It is also
important, in emphasising the regularity with which genocide occurs in modern
world history, to stress that it is not a universal feature of the modern international
system, but has occurred only in particular types of historical context, which I shall
examine in turn.6
6 In this sense I do not agree with Mark Levene’s proposal (in Genocide and the Nation-State (London:
I. B.Tauris, 2005) that genocide should be seen as a problem of the modern world system in its most
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One more preliminary: I cannot avoid the vexed question of the meaning of
genocide. This form of political violence is often defined very narrowly, as the
deliberate mass killing of all members of a nation, ethnicity or similar group.7
However the inventor of the word, Raphaël Lemkin, meant by it something
diﬀerent: a general class of policies and actions directed towards the ‘destruction’
of a ‘group’. He saw physical destruction as only one among many diﬀerent
methods, among which he listed economic, political and cultural as well as
biological means.8 The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, adopted by the UN in 1948, also adopted a relatively broad
definition (if narrower than Lemkin’s), specifying killing as only one of five means.9
My view is that genocide is a generally violent type of action or policy – that must
be what is meant by the ‘destruction’ of a group – but that the relationships
between killing, rape, expulsion and the many forms of coercion involved are
matters of empirical investigation rather than definition. Moreover, although most
targets of genocide are what we call ethnic or national groups, these categories are
not essential to the definition of genocide, since the same type of violence may be
used to destroy populations defined by perpetrators in a variety of ways – and it
is their definitions which determine who is attacked.10 What the targets of genocide
have in common is that they are largely unarmed civilian populations, so genocide
occurs when ‘armed power organisations treat civilian social groups as enemies and
aim to destroy their real or putative social power, by means of killing, violence and
coercion against individuals whom they regard as members of the groups’. It is also
important to note that genocide is not simply one-sided action, but ‘a form of
violent social conflict or war, between armed power organisations that aim to
destroy civilian social groups and those groups or other actors who resist this
destruction’.11
In my terms, therefore, Miloševic´’s murderous expulsion of the majority of
Kosovo Albanians in March 1999 constituted genocide. Of course some scholars
follow Blair in describing this episode by the euphemistic term, ‘ethnic cleansing’,
which emerged from Serbian nationalist discourse during the Bosnian war (even if
it was anticipated by discourses of racial ‘purification’ and ‘cleansing’ in many
earlier episodes), was then adopted by international institutions and media, and is
now widely used to describe the deportation, forcible removal or induced flight of
populations. The numerous historians and historical sociologists (such as Andrew
Bell-Fialkoﬀ, Norman Naimark, Phillip Ther, and Michael Mann) who have
general sense: rather I see it as a product of specific historical conjunctures in the development of
this system, an argument I develop in my forthcoming paper, ‘Genocide in International Relations:
Endemic and Systemic Manifestations in Twentieth-Century Europe’.
7 For example, genocide is defined by Helen Fein as ‘sustained purposeful action to physically destroy
a collectivity’, ‘Genocide: A Sociological Perspective’, Current Sociology, 38 (1990), p. 23; by Frank
Chalk and Hans Jonassohn as ‘a form of one-sided mass killing’, The History and Sociology of
Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), p. 24; and by Israel
Charny as ‘the mass killing of a substantial number of human beings’, ‘Toward a Generic Definition
of Genocide’, in G.A. Andreopoulos (ed.), Genocide: Conceptual and Historical Dimensions
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994), p. 75. For a critique, see Martin Shaw, What
is Genocide? (Cambridge: Polity, 2007), pp. 28–33.
8 Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government,
Proposals for Redress (New York: Carnegie Foundation for International Peace, 1944), pp. xi–xii.
9 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948).
10 Chalk and Jonassohn, The History and Sociology, p. 24.
11 Shaw, What is Genocide?, p. 154.
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adopted this term have emphasised the diﬀerence between expelling and extermi-
nating a group.12 However in terms of Lemkin’s original concept, such policies can
be seen as genocide because they are always designed to destroy a particular
group’s pattern of social life in a given territory and they always involve killing,
violence and extreme coercion. Expulsion and murder are two diﬀerent methods of
destroying groups; but the end of group destruction, which is central from a
sociological point of view, is the same. Moreover while in principle expulsion and
murder are diﬀerent methods, the idea of peaceful or humane transfers is mythical.
Uprooting whole populations from their homes, land and communities, in which
their ancestors have often lived for centuries, is always experienced as the
fundamental, violent destruction of a way of life. Thus while there are certainly
large diﬀerences between the least and most murderous destructive policies, those
who wish to confine ‘genocide’ to the few cases of attempted total mass murder like
the Final Solution ignore the fact that the latter are generally preceded and/or
accompanied by policies of deportation and expulsion. (The Nazis first removed
Jews from their homes and concentrated them in ghettos, before they developed
extermination policies; yet their earlier policies already showed the same destructive
animus towards Jewish society in Europe). So while Serbian policies in Kosovo,
like Nazi policies in 1939–1940, were vastly less murderous than the Final Solution,
they were still genocidal. We would not argue that there was no war in Kosovo
because the conflict was not as murderous as the war on the Eastern Front in
1941–1945; likewise we should not dismiss genocide in Kosovo through maximal
historical comparisons.
Therefore genocide, like war, is a general type of action and conflict, which
comes in many shapes, sizes and degrees of murderousness. This idea, which was
fundamental to Lemkin’s original approach, was already being marginalised when
the UN drafted its Genocide Convention in 1948, excluding any specific reference
to expulsion (a policy the Allies themselves carried out and endorsed), although
this was the most common method through which states (and others) deliberately
destroyed national, ethnic and other groups. As William Schabas notes: ‘There is
no doubt that the drafters of the Convention quite deliberately resisted attempts to
encompass the phenomenon of ethnic cleansing within the punishable acts.
According to the comments accompanying the Secretariat draft, the proposed
definition excluded ‘certain acts which may result in the total or partial destruction
of a group of human beings [. . .] namely [. . .] mass displacements of population’.13
The loss of this meaning has been further emphasised in recent years, particularly
because of the influence of the Holocaust paradigm on the concept of genocide in
general. Thus international law has increasingly treated genocide as a specific
12 Andrew Bell-Fialkoﬀ, Ethnic Cleansing (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996); Norman Naimark, Fires of
Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
2001); Phillip Ther, ‘A Century of Forced Migration: The Origins and Consequences of Ethnic
Cleansing’, in Ther and Anna Siljak (eds), Redrawing nations: ethnic cleansing in East-Central
Europe, 1944–1948 (Boulder: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001), p. 51; Michael Mann, The Dark Side
of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). William
A. Schabas points out that the term is a ‘euphemism for genocide’: Genocide in International Law
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 194. For a critique of the concept, Shaw, What
is Genocide?, pp. 48–62.
13 William Schabas, Genocide in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p.
196; quotation abbreviated by Schabas.
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crime, alongside crimes against humanity and war crimes, as for example when the
International Court of Justice ruled that genocide had been committed in the mass
murder at Srebrenica but not in the general pattern of Serbian policies to destroy
the Muslim community in Bosnia.14 Yet from the point of view of social,
international and historical research, such (in part politically motivated) develop-
ments are retrograde, artificially severing the links between diﬀerent destructive
policies. As genocide studies increasingly transcend Holocaust-centric approaches,
contextualising Nazi anti-Jewish policies in broader patterns not only of European
but of colonial and post-colonial anti-population violence, there is not surprisingly
renewed interest in a broader concept of genocide.15 Such an approach enables us
to examine anti-group and anti-population violence as a whole, examining links
between diﬀerent violent and coercive methods in historical contexts, rather than
validating political claims which prioritise the experiences of particular victim-
groups.16
Genocide in the formation of modern Britain
This expanding genocide literature has forged a number of interpretative frames,
but these have never been systematically applied to the British case. In this article
I remedy this deficiency by considering in turn five themes: the role of genocide in
the origins of the British state; the problem of genocide in the Empire and British
settler colonialism; Britain’s relationships to twentieth-century European genocide;
its role in the genocidal violence of decolonisation; and finally, Britain’s role in the
genocidal crises of the post-Cold War world. This is a broad agenda and so I shall
be sparse with empirical detail; I have drawn on numerous specialist literatures
and, although I have tried to make the necessary qualifications, inevitably some of
my generalisations may seem a little sweeping.
The role of genocide in the origins of the British state may be the least expected
theme. Certainly, problems of genocidal dispossession have been widely examined
in the origins of relatively new states, such as Australia, the US and Israel,17 and
in east-central Europe.18 However the British tend to regard their state as formed
14 See International Court of Justice, ‘Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide’ (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro),
‘Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide’
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), {https://docs.google.com/viewer?url=http://
www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf}; and Martin Shaw, ‘The International Court of Justice:
Serbia, Bosnia, and genocide’, {http://www.opendemocracy.net/globalization-institutions_government/
icj_bosnia_serbia_4392.jsp} both accessed on 2 May 2010.
15 See Ann Curthoys and John Docker, ‘Defining Genocide’, in Dan Stone (eds), The Historiography
of Genocide (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 9–42.
16 A. Dirk Moses, ‘Introduction: The Field of Genocide Studies’, in Genocide: Critical Historical
Concepts (London: Routledge, 2010), Volume 1.
17 A. Dirk Moses (ed.), Genocide and Settler Society; A. Dirk Moses (ed.), Colonialism and Genocide
(London: Routledge, 2007); Ben Kiernan, Blood and Soil: A World History of Genocide and
Extermination (London: Yale University Press, 2007); Mark Levene, Genocide in the Age of the
Nation State: Volume 2, The Rise of the West, (London: I. B. Tauris, 2005); Ilan Pappé, The Ethnic
Cleansing of Palestine (London: Zed, 2007).
18 Donald Bloxham, The Great Game of Genocide: imperialism, nationalism, and the destruction of the
Ottoman Armenians (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Richard Bessell and Claudia B. Haake
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by gradual processes of accretion, as an English state emerged out of the various
Anglo-Saxon and Danish kingdoms, was conquered by the Normans, separated
from their large possessions in modern France, conquered Wales, united with
Scotland and incorporated Ireland to form the United Kingdom – from which the
Irish Republic separated in the twentieth century. Clearly there was, in this long
history, no single foundational genocide as has been argued in other cases.
However genocide is not only a matter of large-scale, coordinated campaigns like
the Holocaust, but also of more episodic, localised ‘genocidal massacres’19 and
expulsions, in the context of military campaigns and religious and political
persecution.
Of these there have been plenty in the history of the English and British states.
I give as examples two medieval episodes from my home county, Yorkshire. First,
Daniel Chirot and Clark McCauley argue, the Norman dynasty owed its hegemony
to an extensive destruction of the indigenous population: ‘William the Conqueror
[. . .] commanded that Yorkshire be cleared of its population in order to break the
ability of the Anglo-Saxon lords of that region to continue their resistance of the
Norman Conquest. No one is sure how many died, but the systematic destruction
of villages and crops, the widespread murder and flights into the surrounding
mountains, where enslavement by Scottish tribes or starvation awaited the refugees,
greatly reduced the population.’20 I don’t entirely recognise the geography to which
these American historians refer (the Yorkshire I know is hardly surrounded by
mountains), but the point that a brutal counter-insurgency made the Anglo-Saxons
victims of what would now be called ‘ethnic cleansing’ or genocide, is well taken.
However a century or so later, some of the English (as they were coming to regard
themselves) were implicated in a diﬀerent violent episode in roughly the same
locale, against the Jewish population. Here I strike a personal note, as the site of
the violence was Cliﬀord’s Tower, the keep of the Norman castle in York, in whose
shadow my mother was born and down whose steep, grassy hillside my own
children later liked to roll. Yet in 1190, the wooden predecessor of the surviving
stone edifice had been burnt down together with about 150 Jews who had taken
refuge in it from a mob; many of them took their own lives rather than be killed,
while others were massacred. The Tower’s tourist website rightly links this event,
which we might now call a genocidal massacre, with the accession of Richard I, the
Crusader king.21 He is an iconic figure in English history, the hero of another of
my boyhood experiences, the TV series of Robin Hood with a catchy theme tune
and Richard Greene in the title role. It was Richard who promoted anti-Jewish
sentiment – although the website reassures us that his Chancellor ‘imposed a heavy
fine on York’s citizens’ as punishment for the massacre. Yet before we build up an
anti-heroic version of English history, let us recall that while Richard was King of
(eds), Removing peoples: forced removal in the modern world (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008);
P. Ahonen et al., People on the move: forced population movements in Europe in the Second World
War and its aftermath (Oxford: Berg, 2008).
19 Leo Kuper, Genocide (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1981), p. 32.
20 Daniel Chirot and Clark McCauley, Why Not Kill Them All? The Logic and Prevention of Mass
Political Murder, p. 14.
21 {http://www.cliﬀordstower.com/index.htm} accessed 10 November 2009.
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England, he hardly spoke English and spent most of his reign – when he was not
fighting the Crusades, concerning which perhaps other questions of genocidal
violence arise – in his Duchy of Aquitaine in modern France.
More directly pertinent to the role of genocide in the formation of the British
state is the long-controversial Cromwellian conquest of Ireland. There is no doubt
that this was a brutal military campaign; but Cromwell’s Irish policy was also,
genocide historian Mark Levene contends, ‘a conscious attempt to reduce a distinct
ethnic population, not simply on the grounds of their religious disposition, but also
for demonstrating their potential to challenge the mono-directional and monopo-
listic thrust of an Anglo-Protestant dominated British Isles. The genocidal process
which emerged after 1651 was [not] simply a short-term military strategy [. . .] It
was a long-term political policy.’ The 1652 Act for the Settlement of Ireland is, he
argues, ‘the nearest thing on paper, in the English and more broadly British
domestic record, to a programme of state-sanctioned and systematic ethnic
cleansing of another people [. . .] The expropriated were to be required to move, on
pain of death, to a designated area the most westerly corner of Ireland and so
make way for a massive new wave of Anglo-Scottish settlers who would supersede
them.’22 This was not extermination in the sense of the Final Solution, Levene says,
but it was – like ‘the Nazis’ 1939–40 projected removal of Polish Jewry’ – the
eviction of ‘a troublesome population whose place within the national or colonial
frame had been definitively and permanently revoked’.23 However, a decade earlier,
in 1641–1642, Irish insurgents in Ulster had killed between 4,000 and 12,000
Protestants who had settled on land whose former Catholic owners had been
evicted. If these massacres ‘were magnified for propagandist purposes to justify
Cromwell’s subsequent genocide’,24 nevertheless they demonstrate something which
modern genocide studies increasingly emphasises: genocidal violence often begins in
the resistance of ‘subaltern’ peoples, only to be followed by the even greater
violence of the imperial power.25
As Michael Hechter argued, this Irish history anticipates the wider history of
British empire and colonisation.26 Within the British Isles, the closest comparison
is the destruction of the Gaelic-speaking clan society in the Scottish Highlands
between the mid-eighteenth and mid-nineteenth centuries. Over this century, a
combination of anti-Jacobite repression, including suppression of traditional
culture (seen as necessary for the consolidation of the Anglo-Scottish imperial
British state), and landlord dispossession reduced a once-thriving society to a
shadow of its former self. If Levene is right to say that there was no singular
22 Levene, Genocide, Volume 2, p. 56, emphasis in the original.
23 Levene, Genocide, Volume 2, p. 57.
24 Tim Pat Coogan, The Troubles: Ireland’s Ordeal and the Search for Peace (New York: Roberts
Rinehart, 1997), p. 6. Of course ‘genocide’ has been used and abused on both sides of the Irish
divide: Robbie McVeigh, ‘“The balance of cruelty”: Ireland, Britain and the logic of genocide’,
Journal of Genocide Research, 10 (2008), pp. 541–63.
25 A. Dirk Moses (ed.), Empire, Colony, Genocide: Conquest, Occupation, and Subaltern Resistance in
World History (Oxford: Berghahn, 2008); Adam Jones and Nicholas A. Robbins (eds), Genocides by
the Oppressed: Subaltern Genocide in Theory and Practice (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
2009).
26 Of course the consolidation of the British state can also be seen through the perspective of
colonisation, as argued by Michael Hecter, Internal Colonialism: the Celtic fringe in British national
development, 1536–1966 (London: Routledge & Paul, 1975).
2424 Martin Shaw
genocidal policy of the kind that was seen in Ireland,27 this was a case, similar to
more distant colonial experiences on which I comment below, in which the
combination of diﬀerent kinds of political and economic policies over time resulted
in the destruction of traditional society. Indeed even in England in the same period,
brutal law-enforcement was directed against the rural and urban poor,28 with sharp
(if not genocidal) repression of the emergent trade unions and the Chartist
movement. Only from the second half of that century did Britain increasingly
deserve a reputation for the peaceful gradualism of its political change, showing
less political violence than many other European countries.
Genocide in British imperialism and colonialism
Yet despite the subduing of the state’s internal foes, international violence
continued. As Leon Trotsky argued, ‘the whole history of Great Britain is first of
all the history of violent changes which the British governing classes have made in
the life of other nations’.29 An even more drastic verdict was recently proposed by
the Native American scholar-activist, Ward Churchill. For him the English are
‘global leaders in genocidal activities, both in terms of overall eﬃciency – as they
consummated the total extinction of the Tasmanians in 1876 – and a flair for
innovation embodied in their deliberate use of alcohol to eﬀect the total extinction
of the many of North America’s indigenous peoples’.30 I am unsure if this
comparative judgement would survive a careful study of other European countries’
colonial records, but it challenges the relatively benign view of British colonialism
in some of the literature,31 which has led to a particular ‘smugness’ about British
imperialism.32 Indeed if there is a problem with Trotsky’s dictum, it is that it was
not only the ‘governing’ classes and those acting directly on their orders, but also
more ‘ordinary’ British people acting on their own accounts who were involved in
violence.33 If the growing literature on empire and genocide has a dominant theme,
it is that settler colonialism is the main problem. Michael Mann, who uses the term
‘murderous cleansing’ for what I call genocide, concludes from a broad historical
survey: ‘The more settlers controlled colonial institutions, the more murderous the
cleansing [. . .] It is the most direct relationship I have found between democratic
regimes and mass murder.’34 Dirk Moses had earlier made a similar argument
about Australia, where about six hundred Indigenous cultural-linguistic groups,
27 Levene, Genocide, Volume 2, pp. 58–9. See also, Eric Richards, The Highland Clearances: People,
Landlords and Rural Turmoil (Edinburgh: Birlinn, 2000).
28 See, for example, E. P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: the origin of the Black Act (London: Allen
Lane, 1975).
29 Leon Trotsky, Where is Britain Going? (London: Pathfinder, 1970), p. 17.
30 Ward Churchill, quoted by A. Dirk Moses, ‘Genocide and Settler Society in Australian History’, in
Moses (ed.), Genocide and Settler Society, p. 4.
31 A. Dirk Moses cites Hannah Arendt’s ‘naïve paen to British expansion’: ‘Genocide and Settler
Society’, pp. 4–5; for a more recent version, see Niall Ferguson, Empire: how Britain made the
modern world (London: Allen Lane, 2003).
32 Maria Misra, ‘Heart of Smugness’, Guardian (23 July 2002).
33 The role of ‘ordinary’ people in genocide is another major theme of the literature: see Christopher
Browning, Ordinary Men: reserve police battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland (New York:
Harper Collins, 1991).
34 Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy, p. 4.
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many of whom regarded themselves as separate peoples, were either wiped out or
drastically reduced in numbers and displaced from their traditional lands.
Although much Aboriginal decline was an indirect result of British settlement, he
suggests that ‘each willed act of extermination by settlers and/or the state of an
Aboriginal group could be regarded as genocide. In that case, many genocides took
place in Australia, rather than [its] being the site of a single genocidal event.’35
Moses’ conclusion is that settler colonialism was structurally prone to genocide,
and the process involved serial ‘genocidal moments’.36 He agrees that settlers and
local militia were the main perpetrators: ‘rarely can exterminatory intent be
discerned in British authorities’, yet ‘there was a greater degree of consciousness
about the fatal impact of their presence’ than defenders of the oﬃcial role have
contended.37 British authorities in London and Australia willed colonial settlement
knowing that it foretold the often-brutal removal of the indigenous inhabitants,
even if they sometimes condemned the specific means that settlers adopted. In the
light of this conclusion, it is surprising that while Australia has had a vigorous
national debate on genocide, British commentators have mostly regarded this as a
purely local aﬀair, without implications for the ‘home country’ from which most
settlers came – or, indeed, were sent as a matter of state policy.38
The converse of the case that settler colonialism is particularly prone to
genocide is that empire without large-scale settlement is less so. In the British
Empire, whereas settler colonies in North America and Australasia generally
overwhelmed indigenous peoples, colonies in Africa often combined seizure of
agricultural lands with rule over large indigenous populations, and the jewel in the
imperial crown, the Indian Raj, saw a situation in which a small imperial caste
ruled over hundreds of millions of Indians (Adolf Hitler notoriously saw this as a
model for his empire in eastern Europe).39 Thus imperial rule in India was not
generally genocidal; but nevertheless, in the light of current debates, major
questions arise about two types of nineteenth century episode. First, genocide
studies have increasingly highlighted the importance of war as the occasion of
genocide.40 In the context of empire, this means that moments of conquest and
rebellion are more dangerous than periods of successful or stable imperial rule. In
Indian history, the Mutiny of 1857 demands attention, first because of the
murderous ‘subaltern’ animus of the rebel soldiers towards the European popu-
lation, including women and children (the subject of much Victorian propaganda
concerning the events), but also because of the brutality of the British military
35 Moses, ‘Genocide and Settler Society’, p. 19.
36 A. Dirk Moses, ‘An antipodean genocide? The origins of the genocidal moment in the colonization
of Australia’, Journal of Genocide Research, 2 (2000), pp. 89–106.
37 Moses, ‘Genocide and Settler Society’, p. 5.
38 A scholarly account which recognises this issue is Dan Stone, ‘Britannia Rules the Waives’, in his
History, Memory and Mass Atrocity: Essays on the Holocaust and Genocide (Edinburgh: Mitchell,
Valentine and Co., 2006). As to political discourse, in this context it is interesting to note the
coordinated apologies of the Australian and British governments for the harm caused to British
children separated from their families and sent to Australia in the mid-twentieth century. See, Peter
Walker, ‘Brown to apologise to care home children sent to Australia and Canada’, The Guardian (16
November 2009). It is also important to recognise the limitations of the oﬃcial Australian
acknowledgement of genocide: Tony Barta, ‘Sorry, and not sorry, in Australia: how the apology to
the stolen generations buried a history of genocide’, Journal of Genocide Research, 10 (2008), pp.
201–14.
39 Mark Mazower, Hitler’s Empire: Nazi Rule in Occupied Europe (London: Allen Lane, 2009), p. 229.
40 Martin Shaw, War and Genocide (Cambridge: Polity, 2003).
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repression which went far beyond the defeat of the rebels to extensive massacres
of Indian civilians.41 Second, genocide studies have delved into the murky histories
of large-scale famine. In several important cases, such as the Stalinist ‘terror-
famine’ in the Ukraine in the early 1930s and the even larger famine resulting from
Mao Zedong’s ‘Great Leap Forward’ in 1958–1961, it has been argued that state
policy disastrously exacerbated the human consequences of climatic failures, and
that leaders who ignored peasant suﬀering eﬀectively willed mass death.42 But
similar claims have been made about famines in British India in the final quarter
of the nineteenth century.43 In these ‘late Victorian holocausts’, as Mike Davis calls
them, British policies exacerbated natural problems: ‘those with the power to
relieve famine convinced themselves that overly heroic exertions against implacable
natural laws, whether of market prices or population growth, were worse than no
eﬀort at all’.44 The result of British inaction was that millions of Indians died.45
Insurgencies and counter-insurgencies during decolonisation in the third quarter
of the twentieth century raised similar questions to the Mutiny. During the
insurrection of the Land and Freedom Army (known to the British as Mau Mau)
in Kenya from 1952–1960, for example, the British detained 160,000 ‘suspected
terrorists’ in camps, while concentrating almost the entire Kikuyu population (1.5
million) in villages ringed with barbed wire. Counter-insurgency tactics included
summary executions; electric shock; mass deportations; slave labour; the burning
down of villages and similar collective punishments; starvation; and rape. Tens of
thousands died from the combined eﬀects of exhaustion, disease, starvation and
systemic physical brutality. In contrast, the ‘savage’ insurgents had killed about
eighteen hundred Kenyan loyalists as well as thirty-two settlers out of a total of
ninety-five ‘Europeans’.46 Here, as often before and since and at many hands,
degenerate counter-insurgency war, much more than insurgency itself, approached
the borderline between extreme repression and the partial destruction of society.
Yet this aroused little opposition in 1950s Britain: as Stephen Howe has
commented, there was nothing like ‘the engagement of Sartre, Camus and others
with France’s crimes in Algeria. Liberal Britain’s muted reaction to the Kenyan
crisis remains puzzling, and shaming.’47 And in today’s Britain, despite the recent
scholarly attention, it is almost forgotten.
There is more to say about this issue in the context of the Empire, but let me
draw some interim conclusions. Clearly the literature does not support facile
41 William Dalrymple, The Last Mughal: The Fall of a Dynasty, Delhi, 1857 (London: Bloomsbury,
2006), pp. 143 et seq.
42 Robert Conquest, The harvest of sorrow: Soviet collectivization and the terror famine (London:
Hutchinson, 1986); Jasper Becker, Hungry ghosts: China’s secret famine (London: John Murray,
1997).
43 Mike Davis, Late Victorian Holocausts: El Ñino famines and the making of the Third World (London:
Verso, 2001), pp. 25–60.
44 Davis, Late Victorian Holocausts, p. 32.
45 Lest we think that these issues concern only the distant past, these attitudes were echoed in the
Bengal famine of 1943, in which, according to Yasmin Khan, ‘the Bengali public had been left
starving to death, and perhaps as many as three million people died because of shoddy government
food allocation and skewed political priorities.’ The Great Partition: The Making of India and
Pakistan (London: Yale University Press, 2007), p. 17.
46 Caroline Elkins. Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain’s Gulag in Kenya (New York:
Henry Holt and Company, 2005), p. 366; see also, David Anderson, Histories of the Hanged:
Britain’s dirty war in Kenya and the end of empire (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2005).
47 Stephen Howe, ‘Forgotten Shame of Empire’ (review), The Independent (21 January 2005).
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equations of British imperialism, or even settler colonialism, everywhere and
always with genocide. Nor does it suggest that central authorities in the British
state developed overall genocidal policies: rather, genocidal moments seem to be
mainly the direct responsibility of settlers, local administrations and military
commanders. But it does suggest that genocide was a repeated problem of British
– as of most other – imperial and colonial expansions, in which the imperial centre
was often, if usually indirectly, implicated.
Britain’s role in twentieth-century European genocide
I move now to twentieth-century Europe, the locus not only of the Holocaust and
the wider Nazi genocide48 but of complex, multi-centred genocidal dynamics. This
is the terrain on which nationalist and Communist regimes were the perpetrators
of some of the most monstrous historical crimes. Indeed genocide became endemic
in important parts of the European international system between roughly 1875 and
1949, from the Balkans before the First World War to eastern and central Europe
as a whole in the Second.49 Britain did not commit genocide, but as a repeatedly
victorious great power could not avoid being implicated in various ways in wider
European developments.
As Donald Bloxham puts it, there was a ‘great game of genocide’ in
south-eastern Europe during the final crisis of the Ottoman Empire. The
Ottoman-Turkish genocide of the Armenians in 1915 was the nadir of a
half-century of anti-population violence between 1875 and 1923, in which both the
Empire and the emergent nation-states carried out genocidal expulsions from their
territories. Throughout this ‘great game’, the British espoused ‘humanitarian’
principles, while tacitly encouraging Armenian and other Christian nationalists
against the Ottomans, to the point of condoning their expulsions of Muslims and
helping provoke Ottoman atrocities. In British responses to the Armenian
genocide, as later with the Holocaust, ‘the warning of punishment for the chief
perpetrators substituted for any overall policy of assistance to the victims’.50
Following the First World War, the British government of David Lloyd George
was central, with the USA and France, to the attempt to manage nationalist
‘population politics’ which dominated the Paris settlement.51 However this process
stimulated the national conflicts it was meant to control: states and nationalist
movements manoeuvred militarily to secure conditions on the ground prior to
international agreement. Notoriously, Britain supported the Greek army when it
48 Lemkin, Axis Rule, referred to the Nazi genocide in general.
49 Bloxham, The Great Game of Genocide; ‘The Great Unweaving: The Removal of Peoples in Europe,
1875–1949’, in Bessell and Haake, Removing Peoples, pp. 167–208; and The Final Solution – A
Genocide (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). Although Bloxham’s idea of a ‘great game of
genocide’ suggests that genocide, in the sense used here, was a general phenomenon, he is
definitionally more cautious than this suggests and refers only to the Armenian case conclusively as
a genocide. See also, Cathie Carmichael, Genocide before the Holocaust (London: Yale University
Press, 2009).
50 Bloxham, The Great Game, p. 138.
51 On this history in general see Eric D. Weitz, ‘From the Vienna to the Paris System: International
Politics and the Entangled Histories of Human Rights, Forced Deportations, and Civilizing
Missions’, American Historical Review, 113 (2008), pp. 1313–43.
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invaded Anatolia in 1919, provoking ‘inter-communal atrocities [. . .] in which the
Greeks were the greater perpetrators’,52 only to be beaten back by the Turkish
army which in its turn brutally attacked the historic Greek populations, notori-
ously at Smyrna (Izmir) in 1922. Bloxham notes the fate of orthodox archbishop
Chrystosomos – who in 1919 blessed the disembarking Greek troops – who was
now torn to pieces by a Turkish mob. ‘Such’, he writes, ‘was the outcome of
Greco-British imperialism in Anatolia’.53 The conclusion to this episode was the
Lausanne treaty of 1923 through which the new Turkey completed by great power
legitimation – and with the Greek-Turkish ‘population exchange’ – the process of
ethnic homogenisation begun in the 1915 genocide.
Elsewhere, too, ‘majority’ national states and movements used the Paris
framework to press home their advantages over minorities, even to the point of
violent expulsion; and the provisions were as successful in provoking powerful
nationalists as in protecting minorities. Indeed Hitler invoked these provisions to
justify his invasion of the Czech Sudetenland in 1938. It would be facile to simply
blame British politicians for these outcomes; but it would be equally facile to see
Britain as apart from the increasingly genocidal logic of much Continental politics.
This conclusion is borne out by an examination of British policies during the
Second World War. Winston Churchill’s well-known reluctance to prioritise action
to stop the Holocaust is one side of this story.54 As Cesarani summarises:
‘Documents show that the British Government knew about the slaughter the Jews
from the moment it began, but did not issue any oﬃcial condemnation of the
genocide until very late. There was no attempt to prevent the genocide, even when
counter measures were feasible. Nor were restrictions on refugee immigration to
Britain or Palestine eased. British policy was to defeat the Nazis without paying
too much attention to distractions such as the persecution and mass murder of the
Jews, or wasting resources on humanitarian initiatives.’55 The other side, however,
is Britain’s reaction when its allies advocated their own genocidal moves to counter
those of the Germans. When in 1942 the exiled Czechoslovak President, Edvard
Beneš, suggested expelling the remaining ethnic German populations from their
countries after the war, the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Anthony Eden, conveyed
his government’s approval.56 When Stalin proposed pushing Poles westwards into
former German territories and expelling Germans from the USSR as well as
Czechoslovakia and Poland, the British and Americans argued over the extent, but
not the principles, of territorial revision and expulsion.57 When, in the concluding
stages of the war and afterwards, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland,
Romania, Hungary and Yugoslavia implemented their German expulsions, the
Western Allies did little even to ensure that they were ‘orderly and humane’, as
their Potsdam agreement with Stalin had required.58 Over ten million were forced
out, at the cost of half a million lives, with the British, Americans and French
52 Bloxham, The Great Game, p. 163.
53 Bloxham, The Great Game of Genocide, p. 165.
54 Michael J. Cohen, Churchill and the Jews, 2nd edition (Abingdon: Cass, 2003), pp. 261–305.
55 Cesarani, Britain, the Holocaust and its Legacy, p. 2.
56 Detlef Brandes, ‘National and International Planning of the “Transfer” of Germans from
Czechoslovakia and Poland’, in Bessel and Haake, Removing Peoples, pp. 286–7.
57 Brandes, ‘National and International Planning’, pp. 290–91.
58 Alfred M. de Zayas, Nemesis at Potsdam: The Anglo-Americans and the Expulsions of the Germans,
2nd edition (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979).
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receiving many expellees into their occupation zones.59 The destruction of German
society avenged, of course, the Nazis’ destructive policies towards the Slav and
other east-central European peoples, rather than their extermination of the Jews,
which was of less concern to the post-war central European governments. (Thus
the broader genocide perspective advocated in this article – and at the time by
Lemkin, who always referred to the general ‘Nazi genocide’ of the occupied
peoples in general – better explains this development than the more common
Holocaust-centric approach). There was some British resistance to these develop-
ments, and even Churchill was discomfited by some of the atrocity reports;60 a few,
Bertrand Russell for example, protested strongly.61 However for most British
people, these expulsions, which destroyed historic communities on a scale – if not
with a murderousness – comparable to that of the destruction of Jewish
communities in the same regions, barely registered. Many tacitly accepted, like the
Soviet, Czech and Polish leaders, the principle of collective responsibility which
made all Germans guilty of Nazi crimes, although this idea was exactly how
Nazism itself viewed Jews, Russians, Czechs, Poles and others.
The principle of collective punishment also provided secondary justification for
the most problematic of Britain’s own wartime policies, the extensive bombing of
German cities. This was not, in itself, genocide: Britain’s prime aim was not to
destroy German society as such, but to destroy the ‘morale’ of the German
population, in order to weaken the Nazi regime.62 Nevertheless the methods had
much in common with overtly genocidal policies: ‘terror-bombing’,63 ‘dehousing’
entire populations,64 destroying whole towns and many of their inhabitants by
flooding, fire and burying them under their ruined buildings. Likewise the
mentality: if it was the US Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau Jr., who
notoriously articulated the idea of permanently destroying Germany’s cultural and
industrial fabric – of ‘pastoralising’ Germany – it was Britain’s Bomber Command
which, in the words of A. C. Grayling, ‘continued to act in ways that gave every
impression of trying to bring about such a result’.65 For the Royal Air Force had
begun its campaign to destroy Germany’s cities by attacking their historic centres
– provoking the retaliatory ‘Baedeker raids’ on British cities listed in the famous
guide – and continued with ‘a concerted smashing of as much of Germany, its
people and its cultural heritage as possible’.66 The campaign was similar in scope
to the US bombing of Japan: both are testimony to the general degeneration of
warfare – already manifested in the brutalities of the Japanese and German
59 Donald Bloxham, Genocide, the World Wars and the Unweaving of Europe (Edinburgh: Vallentine
Mitchell, 2008), p. 122.
60 Matthew Frank, Expelling the Germans: British Opinion and the Post-1945 Population Transfer in
Context (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
61 De Zayas, Nemesis at Potsdam, p. 108.
62 As the Air Staﬀ directive of 14 February 1942 put it, ‘The primary object of your operations should
now be focused on the morale of the civilian population [. . .]’: A. C. Grayling, Among the Dead Cities:
Is the Targeting of Civilians in War Ever Justified? (London: Bloomsbury, 2007), p. 50.
63 RAF press briefing, quoted by Grayling, Among the Dead Cities, p. 72.
64 Grayling, Among the Dead Cities, pp. 59, 82–91.
65 Ibid., pp. 159–62, 176.
66 Ibid., p. 168.
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invasions of China and Europe respectively, to which Allied policies responded –
and to its aﬃnity with the specifically genocidal developments of the same period.67
Britain’s role in the genocidal violence of decolonisation
The last two discussions have emphasised that the British state was mostly not a
direct perpetrator of genocide – although it practised degenerate war in the
colonies as well as against Germany – but it was complicit in genocide committed
by others, particularly British colonists and its allies in European wars. I shall now
argue that this character of oﬃcial British involvement continued after the Second
World War. But important general changes were taking place in the late 1940s, a
major turning-point in the history of genocide. First, the phenomenon was named
by Lemkin and then criminalised by the UN.68 Second, after three-quarters of a
century in which genocide had become an ever more serious strand of European
history, it disappeared from the continent for four decades. It would be nice to
think that this shift resulted from the UN Convention. In reality, however, both
were results of the definitive Allied victory – which in east-central Europe involved
the triumph of Soviet over Nazi population policies – and the subsequent Cold
War which firmly embedded its outcomes. Indeed the progress involved in these
twin developments appears even more doubtful when viewed in its historical
context. Even in the Convention’s own terms, one of the its main authors, the
Soviet Union, could be regarded as a genocidal state: both its wartime deportations
of the ‘treasonable’ peoples – which in a striking coincidence were ratified ‘in
perpetuity’ only two weeks before the Convention was adopted – and the
expulsions of the Germans, arguably fell within its general definition,69 even if as
noted above, it had been drafted to exclude specific reference to this form of
genocidal violence.70 (Indeed in the perspective argued here, the USSR had a larger
genocidal record, including the pre-war ‘liquidation of the kulaks’ and the
terror-famine and the wartime liquidation of the Polish elite; but the better-known
exclusion of political groups and social classes from the Convention’s remit meant
that in its terms, these would not count).71
67 For the idea of ‘degenerate war’, applied to total war in 1939–1945, see Martin Shaw, War and
Genocide (Cambridge: Polity, 2003), chap. 2.
68 Whereas the UN Charter (1945) defined the character of the international organisation to succeed
the League of Nations, Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948) was just that, a declaration
without binding legal significance, and the Geneva Conventions (1949) extended the laws of war
previously agreed at The Hague, the Convention was a legal instrument creating a completely new
supreme type of international crime.
69 Nicholas Werth, ‘The Crimes of the Stalin Regime: Outline for an Inventory and Classification’, in
Dan Stone (ed.), The Historiography of Genocide (Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2007), pp.
400–19; Werth points out (p. 413) that on 26 November 1948, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR ruled
that the Chechens, Ingush, Tartars, etc., whose societies Stalin had destroyed through brutal
deportation and extensive loss of life, should be punished ‘in perpetuity’. Only two weeks after
ratifying this genocide (as Werth rightly sees it), Soviet representatives in the UN voted for the
Convention which they had helped draft.
70 William A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000),
p. 196.
71 Norman Naimark, Stalin’s Genocides (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010).
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Moreover, the late 1940s saw major new genocidal violence outside Europe,
which was to continue throughout and beyond the Cold War period. The new
waves were chiefly but not only in Asia, where the war’s shake-up of old imperial
arrangements caused new conflicts. As the UN drafted the Convention and the
Soviets concluded the elimination of Germans from central Europe, Mao Zedong’s
Communists came to power in China with the aid of large-scale killing of ‘class
enemies’.72 Meanwhile in India, where the war shifted power away from Britain,
the triumph of the national movement was soured by the massive violence of
Partition, in which the number expelled or forced to flee (estimated at twelve
million) and the number of deaths (at least a quarter of a million) roughly matched
those in the expulsions of the Germans.73 Clearly these events were not
orchestrated by a central party or state machine, as in Nazi Germany and the
Soviet Union; but the actions (and failures to act) of the leaders of the Indian
National Congress, the Muslim League (the ruling party of emergent Pakistan) and
the British Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, fatefully influenced them. The first large
massacres pre-dated the Partition plan by nine months, but the imperial authorities
drew it up with cavalier disregard for its probable consequences and, like the
nationalist leaderships, continued with their course although the outcomes were
disastrous.74 Moreover these were not purely spontaneous outpourings: ‘Every-
where there was an element of planning and organisation involved and a sense of
immunity from the governing provincial party – whether League or Congress.’75 In
this sense the Indian massacres have rightly been seen by some recent historians as
genocidal actions, carried out by militia and party organisations.76
The Indian Partition oﬀered, indeed, a new, post-colonial model of genocide:
partial in its attack on the ‘enemy’ population; localised and regionalised in the
scope of its destruction; decentralised in its political leadership; implemented by
paramilitaries rather than regular forces or central state institutions; and yet the
product of conflict over the post-colonial state at the national level, informed by
ethnic or religious politics in a context of electoral democracy. This model
appeared in the moment of transition from the imperial order, and was replicated
in some later decolonisations – for example the handover from Belgian rule in
Rwanda. Indeed it is echoed in conflicts to this day; thus the massacres in Kenya
in 1998 showed (on a smaller scale) a similar pattern of ethnically targeted violence
mobilised by local and regional, party and communal organisations, but focused
on national elections and with nefarious links to national party leaders.77 These
events are currently the subject of a pioneering investigation by the International
Criminal Court,78 but similar violence has occurred in many post-colonial
situations. Britain bears no unique blame for the emergence of this new form, but
72 Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, Mao: The Unknown Story (London: Cape, 2005).
73 Khan, The Great Partition, p. 6.
74 Khan charges Mountbatten with ‘almost breathtaking callousness’ in seeing renewed violence as
helping to influence political leaders to accept his plan: The Great Partition, p. 7.
75 Khan, The Great Partition, p. 62.
76 Paul R. Brass, ‘The partition of India and retributive genocide in the Punjab, 1946–47: means,
methods, and purposes’, Journal of Genocide Research, 5 (2003), p. 75; Ian Talbot, ‘The 1947
Partition of India’, in Stone (ed.), The Historiography of Genocide, pp. 420–37.
77 International Crisis Group, Kenya in Crisis, Africa Report No. 137 (21 February 2008).
78 Xan Rice, ‘Kenyan leaders fail to sanction tribunal to investigate post-election violence’, The
Guardian (5 November 2009).
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its original Indian manifestation is testimony to how genocide can be exacerbated
when great powers mismanage their responsibilities, a theme to which I shall have
cause to return.
I cannot leave this topic without mentioning another case from the same
period, the dispossession of Palestinian Arabs during the creation of Israel in 1948.
This can be regarded as a case of genocide (in the broad sense of deliberate social
destruction argued above) because a campaign was launched, in the context of war,
with the aim of destroying the larger part of Arab society in Israeli-controlled
Palestine, and accomplished through massacres and terror which caused the flight
of those who were not directly expelled.79 Controversy rages, of course, over these
events, with a major divergence between Ilan Pappé and others who emphasise the
degree of central planning by the Zionist leadership, and those like Benny Morris
who see Israeli violence as more circumstantial, opportunist and decentralised.80 It
is not my aim here to adjudicate these diﬀerences,81 but to note that here another
major episode of organised social destruction occurred, as in India but on a smaller
scale and with many fewer deaths, on the British watch. From Palestine I can pull
together the themes of the last three sections: here was dispossession as a result of
settler violence, following from the post-First World War settlement of nationali-
ties issues (including of course the Balfour Declaration), and in the context once
more of a mismanaged British retreat from empire. But there is also a new element:
here Britain acted not just on its own account as in India, nor only on its old
League of Nations mandate, but in the context of the new UN’s own proposals for
partition, whose implementation stimulated violent conflict. Here, the forms of
genocidal violence were depressingly familiar – as Levene says, ‘given that [Zionist]
operations occurred just two or three years after the end of the Holocaust, the ease
with which they took on the aspect of a standard operating procedure is little short
of sickening’.82 However Britain’s role was changing – from an autonomous empire
to a component of a global conglomerate centred on the USA and UN.
Responsibility for disaster was being internationalised, even if Britain, as the power
on the ground, retained a particular share.
79 I have explained my view of these issues more fully in ‘Palestine in an International Historical
Perspective on Genocide’, ‘Palestine in an International Historical Perspective on Genocide’, Holy
Land Studies 9:1 (May 2010).
80 Ilan Pappé, The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine (Oxford: OneWorld, 2007); Benny Morris, The Birth
of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). Mark
Levene agrees that ‘on all this, only one verdict is available, and it is the one that Pappé uses: ethnic
cleansing’. Levene, review of Pappé, The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine, Journal of Genocide Research,
9 (2007), p. 680. However this is too simple a conclusion: in the sense used here, ‘genocide’ is
appropriate.
81 I have discussed the issues surrounding this case in ‘Palestine in an International Historical
Perspective on Genocide’, Holy Land Studies, 9:1 (2010), pp. 1–25.
82 This Levene sumarises as follows: ‘After its onset in the initial tentative attacks, the general lack of
Arab resistance provided a green light to a formula in which villages were surrounded, often at night
or at dawn, and a range of ordnance loosed oﬀ to cause panic. The village having usually then
surrendered, able men and boys were lined up, and sometimes shot – on the spot, or elsewhere. In
worse cases, some where resistance had occurred, sometimes where it had not, a more general
massacre ensued.’ Levene, review of Pappé, p. 676.
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Britain and the genocidal crises of the post-Cold War world
This is the context in which the final part of my argument unfolds. For fifty years
now, Britain has no longer been a major world empire: if genocide continued to
rear its head in former British territories in Africa or South Asia, for example, as
it did in Biafra in 1967 and Bangladesh in 1971, British governments were less
directly responsible than in the Indian and Palestinian partitions, although they
and Britain’s colonial legacy played a significant role in each crisis. Although the
UK continued to claim great-power status through its possession of nuclear
weapons and permanent membership of the UN Security Council, this status was
evidently diminished. There are still residual post-imperial entanglements – such as
those which drove Blair’s government to its unilateral intervention to end the
genocidal civil war in Sierra Leone83 – but the UK has mostly been involved in
multilateral enterprises led by the USA and/or UN.
This is not the place for a full evaluation of international responses to genocide
in recent decades. Suﬃce it to say that despite unprecedented international moves
to halt and punish genocide, the record is often underwhelming. At their worst, the
UN and its peacekeepers have simply handed over threatened civilians to
génocidaires, as happened in Bosnia, Rwanda and East Timor. British governments
and armed forces bear no special shame for one of the worst episodes, as the Dutch
do for the Srebrenica massacre (although British SAS observers ‘stood aside,
powerless’ as the Serbians overran the UN enclave),84 but they have particular
shares in the general Western responsibility. When, after the Gulf War in 1991,
Iraqi Kurds rebelled and Saddam Hussein’s forces terrorised almost the entire
population to flee into the snow-covered mountains bordering Turkey, British
Prime Minister John Major was asked if the West hadn’t encouraged the Kurds to
rebel, Major responded: ‘I don’t recall asking the Kurds to mount this particular
insurrection.’85 Only a campaign in the media, coupled with Turkey’s refusal to
admit the Kurds, pushed Major to join President George Bush in creating a
Kurdish ‘safe haven’ in northern Iraq.86 The following year, over Bosnia, Major
and his Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, manoeuvred to avoid committing British
forces to halt the first genocide in Europe for four decades, and tried to maintain
‘impartiality’ between the principal perpetrators and their victims. As Brendan
Simms has argued, this represented Britain’s ‘unfinest hour’: the Conservative
government ‘sat astride the international management of the Bosnian war like an
enormous dog in the manger, by turns resentful and self-congratulatory, firmly
blocking any attempt at an alternative strategy’. Eventually Britain committed
troops for ‘humanitarian’ purposes, but this ‘was a particularly pernicious case of
misplaced pseudo-activism’87 since it was unwilling to directly oppose genocidal
violence. Moreover, Simms points out, ‘Britain’s failure over Bosnia was not
83 G. Schafer, ‘New Humanitarianism. Britain and Sierra Leone, 1997–2003’, Anthropos, 104 (2009),
pp. 260–1.
84 Brendan Simms, Unfinest Hour: Britain and the Destruction of Bosnia (London: Allen Lane, 2001),
p. 317.
85 ITN News at Ten (4 April 1991), quoted by Martin Shaw, Civil Society and Media in Global Crises:
Representing Distant Violence (London: Pinter, 1996), p. 89.
86 Shaw, Civil Society, pp. 79–96; see also Piers Robinson, The CNN Eﬀect: the myth of news, foreign
policy and intervention (London: Routledge, 2002).
87 Simms, Unfinest Hour, p. 339.
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confined to government. Unlike their American counterparts, parliament and the
opposition failed to mount any significant challenge to the executive.’88 The media
mostly followed the government line.89 Only after Srebrenica, when President
Clinton (who for three years had defaulted on his election-campaign concern for
Bosnia) finally decided for action, did British forces and commanders play their
part in breaking the deadlock and lifting the siege of Sarajevo. Even then, however,
the West was in tacit alliance with Croatia, which carried out its own destruction
of Serb communities in the re-conquered ‘Krajina’; and the Dayton settlement
entrenched the results of genocide, in the division of Bosnia which continues to this
day. Moreover international responses in 1994 to the crisis in Rwanda, where
genocide was even more obvious than in Bosnia, were even weaker. James Woods,
US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense under Clinton, has said that ‘it was [. . .]
a [. . .] spectacle of the US in disarray and retreat, leading the international
community away from doing the right things and I think that everybody was
perfectly happy to follow our lead – in retreat’.90 In fact not everybody was happy
– there were dissenting voices among the non-permanent members of the Security
Council – but the British government seems to have been. As Michael Barnett
records, ‘Britain fought against the initial push for intervention in April, and then
shifted position in May when it had overwhelming evidence of the genocide. Still,
it contributed no real resources.’91 Even a year afterwards, the Foreign Oﬃce did
not accept that ‘genocide’ had taken place, and called discussion of whether it had
‘sterile’.92
Reacting against Major’s record, and perhaps to their own weakness in
opposition, Labour leaders took diﬀerent stances after 1997. Britain became one of
the Rwandan Patriotic Front government’s main international donors, accepting its
share of international guilt for the failure to prevent the genocide. Yet there was
a downside to this position: when Rwanda played a major part in the new war
(which involved localised genocidal massacres and mass rapes) in the Congo, Clare
Short, the Overseas Development minister, ‘was persuaded of the Rwandan
regime’s absolute innocence’ despite evidence of its troops’ ‘extreme violence’
against civilians.93 When Serbian repression grew in Kosovo in 1998–1999, Blair
took the stand to which I referred above. Yet while NATO’s intervention was
ultimately successful in halting genocide, in other ways this was a more
problematic venture. NATO ‘fought’ exclusively from the air, because most of its
nineteen governments did not dare to risk soldiers on the ground. This led to
unprecedented successes in force protection (no NATO personnel died at Serbian
hands) but condemned several hundred Serb and Albanian civilians to immolation
88 Simms, Unfinest Hour, pp. 340–1.
89 Gregory Kent, Framing war and genocide: British policy and news media reaction to the war in Bosnia
(Cresskill, NJ.: Hampton Press, 2005).
90 Quoted by Linda Melvern, A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide (London:
Zed, 2000), p. 230.
91 Michael Barrnett, Eye-Witness to a Genocide: the UN and Rwanda (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
2002), p. 171.
92 Melvern, A People Betrayed, p. 230.
93 Gérard Prunier, From Genocide to Continental War: The ‘Congolese’ Conflict and the Crisis of
Contemporary Africa (London: Hurst, 2009), p. 219.
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by bombing.94 And although NATO ensured the return of the expelled Albanians,
it failed to prevent revenge expulsions of Serbs. Thus even the relative success of
British and NATO policy was tarnished, both by the transfer of risk to civilians
during the war and by lack of determination in the aftermath. Indeed Kosovo
shows that Western governments face formidable problems in the use of military
power to halt genocidal violence. Anything less than direct, dedicated protection of
civilians – and high-altitude bombing can rarely provide that – risks encouraging
a genocidally inclined enemy to escalate its violence, as Miloševic´ did after NATO
began bombing. And military intervention loads formidable post-conflict respon-
sibilities onto Western governments and international institutions, to which they
are often inadequate.95
These dangers are not confined to professed ‘humanitarian’ interventions, but
are general problems in the Western use of military power. Many of the West’s
enemies have ethnicised ideologies and agendas, hence many interventions risk
them turning their guns on civilians as well as Western forces. Nowhere has this
been clearer than in Iraq, where Saddam Hussein’s regime already had a
formidable genocidal record, and where US and UK sanctions policies, combined
with his response, had already produced mass death and suﬀering in the 1990s.96
But questions of genocide also arise in relation to events since the invasion of 2003.
The reality has been somewhat obscured by the debate about whether civilian
casualties since 2003 number around 100,000 as organisations tabulating recorded
deaths estimate, or upwards of 600,000 as estimated by indirect methods.97 For
even on the lower figure, it is evident that the majority of casualties have not
resulted directly from US or Coalition military actions, but from what is called
‘sectarian violence’ by Sunni-based Iraqi nationalists and some of the Shi’ite
militia. In the terms of this article, this violence has had a genocidal character:
Al-Qaeda in Iraq and other militia have deliberately targeted Shia and other
non-Sunni communities in Baghdad and elsewhere, using murder and terror to
force them out of, and destroy non-Sunni communities in the areas they control;
and some of the opposing militia have turned on the Sunni population. Possibly
the greatest scandal of Iraq today is the extent to which they succeeded: 1.9 million
people, mainly Shia but including nearly all Iraq’s remaining Jews, Christians and
other minorities, have been forced to take refuge in neighbouring countries, while
2.6 million are estimated to be internally displaced.98 Tempting as it might be to
blame this entirely on the Iraqi factions, it raises large questions about the indirect
responsibility of US and British leaders. In opting for ‘invasion lite’ to topple
94 This ‘risk transfer’ is a structural feature of contemporary Western warfare: see Martin Shaw, The
New Western Way of War: Risk-Transfer War and Its Crisis in Iraq (Cambridge: Polity, 2005).
95 For an account of international failures in Kosovo, Iain King and Whit Mason, Peace at any Price:
How the World Failed Kosovo (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006).
96 For a discussion of both within a genocide frame, see Levene, ‘Britain’s Holocaust Memorial Day’.
97 Thus Iraq Body Count estimates the death toll in Iraq since 2003 as within the range 94,768–103,410
up to December 2009; {http://www.iraqbodycount.org} accessed on 16 December 2009. In contrast,
Gilbert Burnham, Riyadh Lafta, Shannon Doocy, and Les Roberts, ‘Mortality after the 2003
invasion of Iraq: a cross-sectional cluster sample survey’, The Lancet (11 October 2006), estimated
654,965 excess deaths related to the war, or 2.5 per cent of the population, up to the end of June
2006.
98 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, {http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e486426.html} accessed on 30
December 2009, reporting the situation as of 1 January 2009. Of course a considerable proportion of
the refugee and displaced populations undoubtedly result from earlier wars and genocidal campaigns.
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rather than crush Saddam’s regime, and precipitating a transition in which Shia
politicians would inevitably prevail over the previously dominant Sunni, the
Coalition provoked a lengthy insurgency, turned against the Shia population as
well as itself. Since George W. Bush and Tony Blair emphasised the link between
the War on Terror and Iraq, they should not have been surprised that Al-Qaeda
and similar groups – known for both their mass killings of civilians and their
violent sectarianism against Christians, Jews and Shia Muslims – should have
turned their ‘resistance’ against the softer target of the civilian population. The
gravest charge, therefore, that we can lay against the Bush and Blair governments
is that their invasion provoked a low-level genocidal conflict in Baghdad and
elsewhere, whose consequences are still being felt by millions of Iraqis.
Iraq underlines the inevitable contradictions of oﬃcial Western positions today.
Governments and international organisations proclaim unprecedented commitment
to the prevention of genocide – over Darfur, the Bush administration even
acknowledged ‘genocide’ as it happened, even if the British government, like the
UN, failed to follow this lead. Yet they continue to use military power in ways
determined primarily by perceptions of national interest, calibrated by considera-
tions of force-protection enmeshed with electoral calculation, in which the interests
of civilians in war zones are well down the list of priorities.99 If the failure to
respond to genocide is a clear pattern in recent decades, so too is partial, ineﬀective
and (as in Iraq) fundamentally misconceived intervention, which stokes the very
fires it claims to put out. It is tempting, in the British context, to frame this as the
dilemma between the Major and Blair paths of national irresponsibility. But this
might trivialise a structural dilemma on whose horns Western politicians in general
are very deeply impaled.
At this point we should remember that responsibility for addressing genocide
does not rest only with governments. Armed conflict in general, including genocidal
crises, is now subjected to unprecedented, multi-centred global surveillance, not
only from states but also from media, civil society, public opinion, law and
academia. To Western policymakers and military leaders, it may often seem as
though this constrains their room for manoeuvre more than that of genocidal
states and movements. Yet the latter are also sometimes forced to trim their
policies in the light of international pressure resulting from tribunals, media and
NGO campaigns.100 In the Internet age, even individual citizens have new means
of influencing national and global policies. This is not to suggest that global civil
society is riding confidently to the rescue:101 the evidence of the last two decades
suggests that building a global public sphere that can decisively impact on these
issues will be altogether more diﬃcult than some believed after 1989.
Is there a special British responsibility to respond to genocidal violence in
today’s world? If so, it is not only because much of it occurs in countries to which
Britain is linked by imperial legacies – and new histories of intervention. Nor is it
because Britain has an intrinsically privileged role in the world, as envisaged on the
99 Shaw, The New Western Way of War.
100 James Gow argues that Miloševic´’s capitulation over Kosovo can only be explained by his
indictment by the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia: The Serbian Project and
Its Adversaries: A Strategy of War Crimes (London: Hurst, 2003), pp. 292–301.
101 For an optimistic view, Mary Kaldor, Global Civil Society: An Answer to War (Cambridge: Polity,
2003).
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one hand by the proponents of the ‘special relationship’ with the USA, and on the
other in the kind of liberal ‘moral imperialism’ which believes that if only Britain
would lead, the whole world would follow.102 Britain’s responsibility has more
prosaic sources: its continuing centrality to global state networks, with overlapping
memberships of the UN Security Council, NATO, the EU, the G8, G20 and other
major international organisations; and its high-profile roles in the global media,
NGO and academic spheres. All of these mean that despite the country’s secular
decline relative to greater powers, British politicians, broadcasters, campaigners
and even academics are well placed to influence wider responses. Hence the current
weakness of genocide studies in Britain, compared to the USA or even Australia,
is a matter of regret, not least because British traditions in historical and social
research could oﬀer correctives to the willingness of some American scholars to tie
their work too closely to specific victim-group agendas.103
This article has shown the complex and changing parameters of British
responsibility for genocide. It is not just that, as David Cesarani argued, the
Holocaust is ‘a part of British history’;104 the wider history of genocide has
touched and been touched by British history in many diﬀerent ways. We cannot
assume that other countries are the problem, Britain part of the solution. The idea
of ‘bad/guilty’ and ‘good/vigilant’ nations belongs more to genocidal myth than to
anti-genocidal understanding. Whole nations never stand unequivocally on one side
of the historical process: complexity and ambiguity are the norm. British
governments and people have been part of the problem, possibly as or more often
as they have been part of the solution. As British citizens and as scholars, we have
responsibilities not just to be vigilant, but to investigate the reasons why our
politicians, state and social institutions have not always been vigilant, and why
indeed they have sometimes been complicit in or indiﬀerent to genocide. The
historical lessons are varied, but they leave no reasons for complacency.
102 For a critique of this approach in the context of unilateral nuclear disarmament, see Richard Hinton,
Protests and Visions: Peace Politics in Twentieth-Century Britain (London: Hutchinson, 1989).
103 Moses, ‘Introduction’.
104 Cesarani, Britain, the Holocaust and its Legacy, p. 1.
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